Summary
US military presence around the world is usually justified as necessary to maintain stability. Stability enhances security and promotes economic activity, thereby contributing to world economic growth.
1 But the connection between stability and economic activity, though appealing, is difficult to quantify. If the expectation that the US will maintain stability has already been internalized by decision makers, then only changes in US policy or in its ability (or perceived ability) to maintain stability can produce a detectable change in decision makers. How can the impact of US presence on stability be ascertained?
Because it is difficult to assess the importance of US presence for continuous control in the international arena, this study concentrates on events that have required direct intervention. We will address the question of the impact of US military actions on business decisions by investigating the possible connection between overt military action and international investment flows. We concentrate on US actions in the last 30 years, and try to associate them with the evolution of investment flows.
We address the following questions:
• Can the action be interpreted as a correction to a deterioration in stability?
• Does the evolution of investment flows support the idea that the action was (was not) a correction to a problem?
1. There is a vast literature that relates security issues, trade, investment, and growth. A good place to start when considering FDI is the World Bank's FDI website, http://rru.worldbank.org/Resources/foreign_direct_investment.asp, especially their annual World Investment Reports. See also The World Economic Forum's Workshop on Security and Political Risk at http://www.weforum.org/pdf/Atelier/SecurityAndPoliticalRisk.pdf which covers the importance of security to the investment decisions of multinational corporations.
Our results suggest that US military actions affect FDI only when the action helps resolve an uncertainty/crisis. Further,
• Only the final outcome of the crisis matters, and that may or may not coincide with the military actions. In all but Iran and Libya, our results show that FDI appears to have been influenced by military action. But the effect is a result of the final outcome of the intervention and not of the military action per se.
-In several of the interventions we examined the end of military actions and final outcome of the crisis did not occur simultaneously. For example, data on the Yugoslavia crisis show that the bombings did not significantly affect FDI, but the Dayton Accords did.
-In other interventions, such as the Gulf War and Panama, the end of military actions coincided with the final outcome of the crisis. In these cases, the military actions quickly achieved the intended goals and FDI reacted to the achievement of those goals. It is not possible to tell whether the reaction in FDI is due to the military action or to the end of the crisis in these cases.
-In Haiti, the "military action" was very ambiguous since the landing was unopposed (i.e. no shots were fired). However, it is clear that FDI only improved after the US turned over management of the country to civilians.
• The resolution of the uncertainty may imply an increase in FDI, a decrease in FDI, or no change in FDI.
-In Grenada, the increase in FDI after the intervention suggests a positive effect on FDI from the military action. 2 In this case, the action was quick and the goals clearly achieved.
-In Somalia, we see almost no change in FDI after the military action there. In this case, FDI was almost zero before the intervention and remained at the same level afterwards. Businesses likely did not think that there were favorable investment opportunities in Somalia before or after the crisis.
All of the above actions were in response to specific crises. That is, something had changed that triggered the intervention. The period immediately before the intervention shows FDI reacting to the deteriorating situation. FDI does not appear to react appreciably to military actions that were in response to behaviors that were not explicit crises.
For example, in the cases of Libya and Iran, the military actions were small. They were in response to behaviors which were not crises and the results of those military actions were unclear. TNCs were not in any better position to ascertain the future after the military actions occurred and FDI did not appreciably change in any way that could be associated with the action.
Introduction Background
US military presence around the world is usually justified as necessary to maintain stability. Stability enhances security and promotes economic activity, thereby contributing to world economic growth. 3 But the connection between stability and economic activity, though appealing, is difficult to quantify. If the expectation that the US will maintain stability has already been internalized by decision makers, then only changes in US policy or in its ability (or perceived ability) to maintain stability can produce a detectable change in decision makers. How can the impact of US presence on stability be ascertained?
This paper is part of a CNA-initiated study whose goal is to understand these relationships. A previous CNA study looked at indirect links between investment decisions and military operations. 4 Here we attempt to make a direct link.
One way to address the issue is by interpreting the international arena as an anarchic dynamic system. of Marx Brothers mayhem, anarchy is not the same as chaos. Anarchy in this context refers to a situation in which agents must acquire and defend resources without the help of an overarching authority. Anarchy can be stable or it can degenerate into chaos. The stability of the international anarchic environment is of fundamental importance for the outcomes of international economic activities.
Most productive economic activities imply a separation in time between investment and the associated return. Agents considering investment must imagine the different possible outcomes of their projects and the likelihood of each possible outcome. A stable environment reduces the uncertainty over the possible outcomes. This reduced uncertainty implies lower required rates of return on potential projects and thereby increases the number of projects with acceptable returns.
By definition, an anarchic international arena means that there is no higher authority to ensure stability. That is, stability exists only as the outcome of the actions taken by the international agents. A range of stability can be maintained through "continuous control." By continuous control we mean the effects that the US may have on decision makers by simply being peacefully engaged. US presence around the world, as a physical representation of US policies, provides a level of continuous control because agents internalize the possible consequences of destabilizing actions and tend to avoid those actions.
Although continuous control through presence appears to be associated with a given level of stability, from time to time the dynamic system may require more direct control actions to keep it within acceptable boundaries. A number of situations may cause this to happen:
• An agent's perception of the consequences of its actions may change. Saddam Hussein may have been led to believe that the US had lost its tolerance for military casualties and therefore in the end it would accept an Iraqi takeover of Kuwait.
• Circumstances may arise in which individuals must make a concerted effort to avoid instability but they lack coordination. An example of this may have been the disintegration of Yugoslavia. It was apparent that the European countries were finding it hard to coordinate a response until the US took the lead.
When agents do not regulate their actions as necessary to maintain the current level of stability, a more vigorous act is required to put the system back within acceptable boundaries.
From an investor's point of view, continuous control implies a given constant level (or range) of predictability. Investors' decisions take that predictability for granted; it affects each choice equally, so it is not a factor to use in discriminating between choices. On the other hand, a direct action taken to exercise control does require that investors reassess their choices. In fact, because direct action usually requires a trigger, investors may start adjusting some time before the intervention takes place. This is more evident when the situation leading up to the intervention develops slowly. Stability (or expected stability) steadily deteriorates and investors react to the deterioration. When a certain point is reached, direct action is taken. The outcome of the action is evaluated by the investors, and adjustments are made.
Approach
Methodology
We will combine regression analysis with historical information to determine whether there is support for the contention that investment flows are affected by an intervention only if the intervention is accompanied by a change in stability. We would like to associate positive regression results with a plausible story. Without a story, the existence or non-existence of a statistical relation is simply suggestive.
For the regressions, we use Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows into the country or region of interest as the dependent variable. We control for world trends by using a variable for FDI inflows into all of the developing world. We then use dummy variables for the years of interest. Years of interest include years of deterioration as well as interventions or corrections. We also include dummies to control for other specific events not related to the intervention.
Data

FDI data
The data on FDI are from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Transnational Corporations' (TNCs') FDI database. 6 The database defines FDI as an investment that gives a foreign investor at least 10% ownership. FDI can take three forms: acquisition of existing assets, joint-venture with a local business enterprise, or the building of production facilities.
The data are annual values that cover almost all of the world's countries from 1970 to 2001. Quality and availability of countries' data vary: the data for developing countries are less reliable than data from the industrialized countries. UNCTAD combines data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and supplements those data with its own in-house database on TNCs.
For purposes of this study, the data were deflated to the base year 1996 using a GDP price deflator from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Data on interventions
Intervention data are freely available from various news and historical sources.
All interventions are simply interpreted as an action taken by the US. These actions have differed in many ways. For example, they can vary in purpose and scope:
• To fix something (this is usually a crisis event) or to punish, and thus discourage, undesirable behavior.
• Unilateral vs. multilateral.
Although the US has carried out many more actions--for example, in the Middle East region--very few of them have required actual shooting. Also, many of them have been short (one or two days of ship movements), of ambiguous aim (being there "just in case"), and apparently directed at nonstate actors (especially after terrorist attacks). Yugoslavia (1992 Yugoslavia ( -2000 Yes, NATO, UN Change Behavior Yes Grenada Invasion (1983) No Change Government Yes Panama invasion No Change Government Yes Haiti intervention (1994) Yes, UN Change Government Yes Actions against Libya (1981 Libya ( , 1986 No Change Behavior ?? Actions against Iran (1980, 1988) No Change Behavior ?? War/Actions against Iraq (1991-present) Yes, UN Liberate Country, Change Behavior Yes, ?? Somalia intervention (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) Yes, UN Restore Order No a. There is no final word on whether the aim was achieved or not. The decision here is based on a combination of clear outcomes, like government change or country liberation, plus whether the US continued to intervene after the fact, and whether US statements about the particular country changed in any way after the event.
Individual results
Since the US is a major force in the world both politically and economically, we will first look at the evolution of world FDI and the possible effects of US interventions at that level. We will then look at each of our eight chosen interventions and discuss the effects they appeared to have on FDI inflows into the region and the country. 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 These recessions are associated both with disruptions in world oil production and with slowdowns in world FDI inflows. Hamilton 9 has shown that the world recessions were triggered by the disruptions in oil. High oil prices and the implied negative effects for economic growth reduce the expected returns from overseas investments and motivate a reduction in FDI flows.
World FDI
Because oil is such a key input to world production, MNCs consider any major developments associated with world oil as important in their decisionmaking. In only one of the four major oil events did the US intervene militarily in a way that resolved the crisis. Once the Persian Gulf war was over and the uncertainty about oil production reduced, FDI returned to its pre-crisis trend.
One plausible story on the effects of US military interventions on world FDI flows is not enough to make a general conclusion. Whether a crisis is of concern to MNCs is difficult to determine at such an aggregate level. In the next sections, by focusing on countries and regions we can, to a higher degree of confidence, assume that an intervention is of some relevance to FDI flows into those regions/countries. Then, the possible connection between US interventions and FDI flows may be clearer. Figure 2 shows FDI flows into the Balkans (FDIB) region. In general, the region's FDI tended to track FDI into the developing world (FDIDW). Data for the region are only available from 1980. In 1994 and 1995, FDIB followed its own path, and in 1996 it returned to tracking FDIDW. The interpretation is that FDI was negatively affected when MNCs perceived a "problem" in the region. The problem was a combination of intensified fighting together with US and NATO bombings. These events increased the uncertainty in the outlook for investment motivating an apparent "hold" on FDI activities. FDI returned when a "correction" to the problem, the Dayton Accords, was applied. Table 2 reports the results of the regressions.
Yugoslavia and the Balkans
The variable Dummy1994-1999 represents the "problem," while the variable Dummy1996-1999 represents the "correction." The first regression shows that the problem has a negative effect on FDI and the correction has a positive effect, though only the problem is significant. In the second regression, we have a dummy for the net effect of the problem and the correction: the two years before the accords were signed. This variable is negative and highly significant indicating that the period was associated with a fall in FDI.
The results tell us that, from the MNCs' point of view, 1994-1995 was a period of increased uncertainty. Only after the accords were signed did this uncertainty subside. The accords were the result of efforts on many fronts and were supported by many nations. Although the US did play the leading role, military actions were a group effort and investors appear to have waited for the results rather than acting on the military actions. The MNCs were considering the whole picture and not solely concentrating on military actions. The Gulf War and the Middle East
Compared to Yugoslavia, figure 3 shows that there is less correlation between FDIDW and Middle East FDI (FDIME). For FDIME we have not included Saudi Arabia, as its FDI is very much oil oriented and shows very large changes. We also have not included the countries of interest Iran and Iraq. We have also included a dummy for the Iran-Iraq war, DIIWAR, which is positive and highly significant. The interpretation is a possible shift in FDI flows into the rest of the region during the war.
It is interesting to note that the reaction of FDI flows into the region is different for each event. During the Iran-Iraq war there appears to have been a shift of FDI to the rest of the region, whereas during the Gulf War there was a reduction. An interpretation is that MNCs perceived major dangers all across the region from a US intervention. They may have feared that foreign companies would suffer a backlash across the entire region. In contrast, a war between two regional states would not implicate the MNCs.
FDIDW is negative and barely significant at the 10% level. The region does not appear to have benefitted from the upward trend of FDI into the developing world. The military action in the Gulf War had a more direct effect. The action itself was overwhelming and secured very quickly the goal of pushing Iraq out of Kuwait. TNCs were immediately confident the goals had been achieved. FDI flows into the region quickly returned.
Iran and the Middle East
In January 1984, the US declared Iran a sponsor of international terrorism. This automatically imposed trade and investment sanctions for US companies. As time passed, other sanctions were added. They culminated with the 1996 Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, which imposed penalties on companies from any nation that were doing more than $40 million in business with Iran. A dummy for sanctions did not prove significant. This may be because by 1984 the Iran-Iraq war had already reduced the flows of FDI and the sanctions have simply helped maintain them at low levels since then. Figure 5 shows that FDI into North Africa (FDINA) has a general trend that seems to follow FDIDW. The two US military actions do not appear to be correlated with specific shifts in FDINA. The diagram shows that FDI into Libya (FDIL) followed its own path. Also, US actions do not appear to correlate with expected FDI changes. The 1981 action happened in a year in which the FDI variable was increasing. The data show negative FDI inflows, meaning that MNCs were selling off assets. The "increase" after 1981 may mean that MNCs were running out of assets to sell.
Libya and North Africa
The 1986 action is associated with a fall in FDI. The year also coincides with the beginning of US sanctions. The whole period of US sanctions is difficult to correlate with FDI, as it is initially associated with a sharp fall and then with steady positive inflows. Only after the imposition of UN sanctions do the inflows turn down and negative again. An initial regression showed serious autocorrelation of the error term of the regression. This can be interpreted as the result of some unknown variable or shock affecting FDI flows over more than one period. This "memory" characteristic of FDI inflows affects the significance of the explanatory variables. We correct for it by adding one lag to the error term. The results are provided in Table 6 . The error autocorrelation term is the only variable that is significant.
The results can be interpreted as showing how FDI into Libya was isolated from that of the rest of the world. Its evolution, the result of a different set of variables. Since 1970 Libya has had a low or negative level of FDI flows. At most, US actions may have played a role in keeping it low.
Panama and Central America
The crisis in Panama, though long simmering, intensified in 1987 out of a power struggle between Manuel Noriega and his Chief of Staff. Business leaders aligned themselves with Noriega's opposition. Riots and a state of emergency followed. In 1988 the US indicted Noriega on drug and arms trafficking. Sanctions were put in place against Panama to include withholding of canal fees. Though not the elected president of the country, Noriega was in fact in control. After one president sought refuge in the Violent harassment of the opposition and of US personnel in the country culminated with the death of an unarmed US marine officer in December 1989. On December 20th, the US invaded. The operation was a short, rapid engagement. Overwhelming force was applied, and there was a definite and easily verifiable objective--bringing Noriega to justice and restoring the elected president.
First, we consider the effect that the invasion of Panama may have had on FDI inflows into the rest of Central America. Figure 7 suggests that FDI flows into Central America followed the FDIDW trend. We can see that there appears to be an uptick leading up to the US invasion, perhaps a result of MNCs shifting to other countries in the region during the period. 1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 Hurricane Mitch October, 1998 Table 7 reports regression results.
Figure 8 depicts FDI flows into Panama (FDIP).
It shows a definite deterioration in the years leading up to the invasion, with quick recovery afterward. The interpretation is that as the regime of Manuel Noriega became associated more and more with instability, investment flowed into the rest of the region. Once the US intervened, investment shifted back to Panama. The D98 variable represents the effects of Hurricane Mitch. The devastation motivated large inflows of FDI for reconstruction. Table 8 reports the regression results.
Grenada, Haiti, and the Caribbean
In the Caribbean region, the US intervened in Grenada (1983) , and Haiti (1994).
The Grenada intervention was triggered by a Marxist coup. The violence of the militants, which executed the deposed leaders immediately after the coup, raised fears for the security of US citizens, mainly medical students, in the country. This fear, combined with the dislike of a having a radical marxist group in the region, and the presence of cuban military personnel on the island motivated direct military action.
In figure 9 , FDI flows into the region show a long-term trend similar to that of FDIDW. It is difficult to see whether the actions in Grenada or Haiti had any effect. In the regression results in Table 9 (where we have corrected for autocorrelation), D9401 represents Haiti and D84 represents Grenada (lagged one period). The results show that neither of the US interventions is significant in explaining the evolution of FDI into the Caribbean region. In Grenada we don't have enough observations to run a regression, but the data that are available hint at improvements after the intervention. Figure  10 shows available data on Grenada's FDI inflows. Note that data are sporadic before the intervention, and become steadily available after the intervention. This in itself gives the impression that things in general improved and that FDI was positively influenced by the intervention.
In Haiti, a military coup in 1991 deposed the recently elected president. Violence and repression followed. Sanctions by the international community to pressure the coup leaders to step down exacerbated the refugee problem. Pressure from many countries and an impending US invasion convinced the coup leadership to return control of the country to the elected president.
The US intervention in Haiti differed from those in Panama or Grenada. First, the US did not have to enter the country by force. The agreement between the coup leadership and the elected president included a transition period handled by a US-led UN force. Second, it spent the time (about two years) administering the government while setting up government institutions to work independently. Figure 11 does show a clear deterioration in the years before the intervention and until the civilian organizations finally assumed responsibility for in-country operations.
In Table 10 we see the results of the regression: Figure 11 . FDI Inflows into Haiti vs. the Developing World. FDI into the developing world is positive and significant. The period starting in 1992, which reflects the crisis and its aftermath, is negative and significant. The period starting in 1995, reflecting the US intervention and its aftermath, is significant but negative. The negative sign may imply that MNCs were better able to assess the condition of the country after the US intervened and that their assessment was negative.
The variable FDIDW*D9501 allows us to test whether the coefficient of FDIDW changed after 1994. The estimate is positive and significant at the 10% level. This indicates that after the US intervention, FDI into Haiti followed the evolution of FDI inflows into the developing world much more closely.
Somalia and Sub-Saharan Africa
Figure 12 compares FDI inflows into Sub-Saharan Africa with FDIDW.
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The figure does suggests some relationship between Sub-Saharan Africa FDI (FDISA) and FDIDW. It also suggests some improvements in FDI flows during the Somalia intervention.
A regression gives the results in table 11.
Events in Somalia help explain FDI inflows into Sub-Saharan Africa. The coefficient for developing-world FDI is positive and significant at the 5% level. All other coefficients are significant at the 1% level. D87 represents a year in which the Somali government accepted the International Monetary Fund's recommendations and incorporated them into the 5-year plan. D8889 represents two years of civil war. D90 represents the year 1990 when the head of state resigned. D9101 represents the period starting in 1991 when no definite leader was available. D9201 represents the period of famine relief and includes the US-UN involvement.
The events related to Somalia's internal turmoil are associated with increases in FDI inflows to Sub-Saharan Africa. There is no logical implication here since Somalia had been in turmoil for a number of years. It is possible that the interest shown by the US and others may have given the impression that more effort would be spent on helping Africa as a whole. This may have motivated an improved outlook for the MNCs. Figure 13 and table 12 show the graph and regression results for Somalia. This implies that there was small disinvestment in process. This may simply mean that there was very little left to disinvest.
The Somalia experience is therefore difficult to interpret. The country's FDI always been small. The fact that the intervention had a negative outcome did not change the outlook for the country. MNCs had no reason to change their negative view of the country's future.
Conclusions and implications
We used the FDI decisions of MNCs to explore the impact of US military interventions. Though the evidence is not definitive, it does suggest some interpretations.
Because an MNC's bottom line is profit, it must evaluate any investment opportunity based on what the prospects are for future economic return. It must consider everything that influences these prospects. In the case of a military intervention, the tactical outcome of a bombing run or a missile attack is not important, but the final outcome of the intervention is. Because the overall picture is what matters to those who have an economic interest in the outcome, the value of the military action must be assessed in that context.
To put some value on the military dimension, all the pieces of the plan must be addressed and their interactions understood. That is, the value of the military depends on how well it has performed its part of the overall plan. The military alone is not wholly responsible for the intervention's outcome. Different interventions have different mixtures of military and non-military actions.
By understanding the role of the military in different types of interventions, we can gain insight into the general role that US forward presence plays in the world at large. Just as in a specific intervention the US military may help with specific security issues, US presence around the world may contribute to overall stability. Further analysis is needed to develop additional quantitative evidence regarding this question. 
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